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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Appellant's made claim under the \V orkmen' s 
Compensation Laws of 'the State of Utah against Fed-
tTated Dairy Farms, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insur-
anee Company, its insurance carrier, for recovery of 
1 
death benefits allowed by said laws, based upon tn, ,·c 





After the initial hearing below, before Robert J rE 
Shaughnessy, Hearing Examiner for the Utah Indus- ti 
trial Commission, an Order was entered finding that the la 
decedent was not in the course of, nor did the accident 
arise out of his employment. A Motion for Review wm \' 
i1led by Appellants which was granted and pursuant 
L thereto an additional hearing was held. Thereafter, the. 
ti same Hearing Examiner prepared and entered Find· 
sl ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment 
d to the effect that the Appellants were not entitled to 
death benefits as Leo L. Lundberg, the decedent, was 
not in the course of his employment at the time of his 
death nor did his death arise out of his employment. A 
motion for review by the Commission as a whole was 
filed by Appellants, which motion, after consideration 
by the Industrial Commission, was denied and the Ap· 
pellants then brought this Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondents seek to have the Court affirm the de· 
cision of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents agree in general with the State· 
ment of Facts set forth by the Appellants and do not 
2 
tn, ,·ontend that any statements contained therein are inac-
curate. However, the Statement of Facts by the Appel-
lants tends to overstate the requirements of the em-
ployer in regard to entertainment and other extraneous 
actiYities that the decedent engaged in and for that 
t J reason, with the understanding that the statement con-
ius- tained herein is to amplify the statement of the Appel-
the !ants, a short statement of additional facts will be added. 
lent First, it should be noted that the Appellant was 
wm 
Wholesale Sales Manager for the employer only in Salt 1anl 
the Lake County and his duties did not involve any activi-
ties in any other area (RllO, 167-168, 120-121). The .nd· 
statement of the Appellants regarding the fact that his ten I 
l to duties included the entertaining of owner and executives 
of his customers is somewhat in conflict with the facts was 
· as stated by his supervisors in the company. They stated his 
A that on numerous occasions, the Appellant had been 
11arned that he was doing too much entertaining and was 
that the company did not require many of the things he :ion 
'ip· was doing. In fact, he was told that, among other 
things, he was spending too much time on the golf course 
IR17, 21-22, 154-155, 176-178). In fact, the decedent 
had been criticized for not spending enough time doing 
eompany work and for spending time on the golf courses 
de· IRI86). 
Insofar as the Appellant's statement that the de-
cedent received some phone calls from customers at 
night and on weekends and his responsibility in relation 
lhereto, it should be noted that normally, because he was 
ite· the \Vholesale Sales Manager for Salt Lake County, 
not those calls were referred to subordinates of the decedent 
3 
known as Supervisors or were deferred for handling un 
til the next day (R31-50, 122, 158) and in fact, one 01 1 
the Supervisors testified that he did not know of an in a 
stance when the decedent went out of his home to per-
sonally take care of a complaint he received after hour.i 
(R49-50). The decedent was paid .08c per mile for the r 
use of his vehicle when he was on company affairs, ex·! 
eluding mileage from his home to the off ice or to his fin! 
call in the morning, or from the office or his last call i11 
the evening back to his home. In spite of the fact he 
was entitled to mileage, the mileage records practical!), 
uniformly reveal an exclusion of mileage that was being! 
charged to the Company by the decedent of approxi- · 
mately 13 miles each evening and, in fact, the undisput. 
able testimony of one of the witnesses who examined tht 
mileage records that are a part of the record on file 
herein, is that he found no indication at all of any mile-
age being charged during any evening. (R 152) 
In relation to the memberships at the Willowcreek 
Country Club and the Towne House Club, it should be 
noted that the employer only paid a portion of the 
monthly expenses incurred at those establishments with 
the decedent paying the balance (R 153). In addition, 
the decedent had a membership in a club known as the 
Yacht Club for which no payment was made by the 
company, either on the initial membership or the ex· 
penses incurred for entertainment at that club (R 153\. · 
However, he did entertain at such club and had a mem· 
bership there (R 78, 125-126, 132-133). 
There is no dispute tha't the use of an automobile 
was essential to the duties required of Mr. Lundberg · 
4 
11! However, as noted by the Statement of Facts by the 
01 Appellants, approximately 50 per cent of his work was 
In at the company offices (R 47, 162). It should be fur-
1er- ther noted that there were always at least three vehicles 
Ufi available to the decedent for his use at the company 
the office (R I56) and that the company felt that the ve-
ex·! hicles available for his use at the office were perfectly 
in! satisfactory and that, in fact, other employees used those 





There was no requirement as to the size, age or 
condition of the automobile that Mr. Lundberg used 
(R159), in fact, one of his supervisors, on many occa-lxi-
sions, discussed with him his using the company's cars ut-
tht (R18I-I82). The deceased on many occasions asked 
file the company to furnish him an automobile for his own 
use twenty-£ our hours a day and was refused (RI 79). ile-
The Appellants contend that on the date of the 
eek decedent's death, he had left his home at a time earlier 
be than usual to in order to arrive at the company off ice 
the for an 8 a.m. meeting. However, the undisputed testi-
rith mony is that it was not unusual to have an 8 o'clock 
meeting at the company offices and that 8 o'clock was 
the normal beginning time for the work day (RI74). 
the Eight o'clock meetings at the office with Mr. Lundberg 
were held continually (R191). Insofar as the Appel-ex· 
a\.. !ant's assumption that the decedent was taking a route 
;m· to work that morning other than his normal route, is 
based upon testimony of his son who rode to work with 
the decedent while he was employed by the employer 
bile for about a month and a half in the summer of I965 and 




THE REVIEWING COURT MUST AF 
FIRM THE COMMISSION'S DECISION GX 
LESS THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCI I 
'"7"1THOUT SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADIC.' 
TION \VHICH POINTS SO CLEARLY Al\'D 
PERSUASIVELY IN CLAIMANT'S FA\'OR 
THAT FAILURE TO MAKE A'VARD 
'VOULD JUSTIFY CONCLUSION THAT 
THE COMMISSION ACTED ERRONEOUSLY. 
ARBITRARILY OR UNREASONABLY IJ 
DISREGARDING OR REFUSING TO BK 
LIEVE THE EVIDENCE. 
Section 35-1-85, UCA (1953) reads in part as fol. 
lows: 
"After each formal hearing it shall be the duty 
of the Commission to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in writing and file the same 
with its secretary. The findings and conclusions 
of the Commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to 
review; such questions of fact shall include ulti· 
mate facts and the findings and conclusions of 
the Commission. . . " 
There has been a multitude of cases that have fol· 
lowed from and interpreted the above quoted statute. 
This point No. I is found in and was taken from Vause 
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 17 Utah 2nd, 217. 
407 Pac. 2nd 1006 ( 1965). This case, as with the whol.e 
line of cases preceding it and those which followed it 
6 
affirm the position that the reviewing court must affirm 
the Commission's decision unless the evidence, without 
.111bstantial contradiction, clearly points to the conclu-
1ion that the Commission in failing to give an award to 
the applicant acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreason-
ably in disregarding or refusing to believe that evidence. 
The cases found in the footnotes to Section 35-1-85 
cited clearly point out the same rule. No further 
r·itations need be given as this point of law is so well 
established. 
It should also be noted in the Vause case (supra) 
that the reviewing court must look at the record and the 
eri<lence before it in the light most favorable to the 
Industrial Commission's finding. It was there said at 
page 1007 as follows : 
"Our statutory and decisional law require us to 
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commission's finding and it is the obligation of the 
parties involved to so present the matter to the court." 
Thus, if evidence is present in the instant case to 
support the fin dings of the Commission, even though 
contradicted or in conflict, the court must find in favor 
of the defendants and against the plaintiff and affirm 
the decision of the Industrial Commission. 
POINT II 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
To SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S FIND-
IXG OF FACT AND ITS CONCLUSION OF 
7 
LA 'V THAT THE DEATH 011-. DECEDE:\. 
DID NOT .ARISE OUT OF HIS El\ll'L01-
_MEN'l' OR 'VITHIN THE COUHSE OF Ht 
It would appear that the sole issue in this case :-
whether or not the decedent, Leo L. Lundberg, did. 
as the result of an accident that occurred iu the cour.1• 
of or arising out of his employment. The Commissio11. 
both in the original order and in the order after tht 
matter was reopened found as follows: 
"The Heariug Examiner finds that the ust 
of the car was essential to the day to day busine" I 
of the deceased. However, no finding can bt 
made that it was rcq uircd. The e\·idence sham 
that there were, in fact, company cars available 
for day to day use of the deceased, if he so de· 
sired." ( R.206). 
"However, it must also be noted that the ern· 
ployed had available at all times a compan,1 
owned vehicle that could be used by the deceased 
at no cost to him. Granted, the vehicles were 111 
remain on the premises after closing hours, but 
there is nothing to indicate that these would nor 
be available during the day ... 
The record is clear also that the fatal injury 
occurred in the morning while the applicant wm 
'on the way to work'. It did not happen after 
hours, during the entertainment of customer.s. 
or on an emergency call or any other time !II 
which the car would be used for the exceptional 
use rather than the use of going to work ... 
The Hearing Examiner agrees that the real 
issue becomes one of 'wa:> the employee perform· 
8 
ing a substantial function or special missions for 
the employer ( The Hearing Examiner believes 
he was not at the time of the accident. The only 
mission apparent was the physical transportation 
of himself to the place of business." ( R232). 
"Giving the most liberal possible interpreta-
tion to the facts, the Hearing Examiner must 
conclude that the 'going to and coming from' 
work exception in the compensation law was in 
effect at the time of the fatal accident to the 
decedent." ( R233) . 
The evidence upon which the above quoted find-
ings was made is very clear. His direct supervisor, 
Winston J. Fillmore, testifies upon his deposition as 
follows: 
On direct examination by appellant's attorney: 
Q. "'Vas there other transportation available he 
could have used?" 
A. "'Ve have trucks that are there he could have 
used. That means more of a sedan delivery 
type. 'Ve did have some available Volks-
wagons that were there for salesmen that 
he could have used." 
Q. "'Vas he ever requested to use these vehicles 
rather than his own private automobile?" 
A. "I don't think I ever requested him to use 
them". 
Q. "'Vould you have expected him to have used 
these automobiles rather than his own pri-
vate automobile?" 
A. "I think that was up to him to make that de-
cision". 
9 
Q. "Say, for example, he was going out fu1 
grand opening or a special event in whiet 
it was quite a well known fact that he wa 
going to use this particular automobile 11 ,. 
transporting a customer or client. 'Voukl \'(11 
have wanted him to make this i1. 1 
a Y olkswagon ?" · 
A. "That would have been perfectly all right' 
with us. 'Ve have other people doing similai 
work using similar automobiles. It would hm1 
made no difference to us what he would hm'. 
used." ( R19-20). 
Vear L. Jensen, another supervisor of the decedent 
stated in response to questions by the defendant's at-
torney at the original hearing in this matter as follom .. 
Q. "Now, was there an extra vehicle arnilaLl1 
at the office at the time of ].\fr. 
death? That is, I'm talking about the montl, 
preceding or for some period of time pre 
ceding that? 'Vas there an extra vchkk 
available there for him for his use t 
A. "'Ve had two Y olkswagons and there wa1 
also a panel truck that were used by super· 
visory people." 
Q. "'Vas it available for his use?" 
A. "Yes." (R156) 
The above quoted testimony in both instances 
absolutely uncontradicted and points out clearly the 
fact that the decedent was not required by the employer 
to furnish his own automobile for use in the course o\ 
his employment but that other vehicles were availabl: 
to him to be used at any time he wished to avail himself 
10 
'Ii' them. There had been a conversation on several Ol'.-
1·asio11s between the decedent and his supervisor, \Viii-
\\0;1 .J. Filmore, regarding his use of a company car. 
.1lr. Filmore testified that he had talked with the de-
' ceclent many times about his using the company car dur-
ing the day and leaving it at the company office at night. 
:1lr. Filmore further testified that was the reason the 
automobiles had been purchased and were at the com-
pany office and that they were available for cfacedent's 
Lise (R 181-182). 
Thus it can clearly be seen that there was no re-
11uirement that the decedent bring his car to ·work for 
his use during the course of a day, and there is no evi-
dence of any requirement or contractual arrangement 
Ltlween the employer and the decedent to haYe the car 
arnilable during the course of any given day. The mile-
age records prepared by the decedent which were used 
for the purpose of paying him his mileage and other 
out-of-pocket expense, are a part of the record herein 
and show a uniform exclusion of between 13 and liJ 
llliles from the close of one day to the morning of the 
11ext day. (R 150-151). At the original hearing of 
this matter, Mr. Vear L. Jensen produced these records 
m<l testified that he found no evidence of any mileage 
being charged at night from an examination of those 
records ( R 152). Thus, by inference, it can be con-
duded that the decedent, himself, did not think tlat 
he h;1d any obligation to bring his automobile to the em-
ployer's place of business each and every day of hi3 
tlll;;loyment. Had he felt such an obligation, he would 
kl\e charged mileage for the bringing of the automo-
' l1ilt. The Appellant's have stressed the need of the de-
ll 
cedent to have an automobile during the course of h1 
work day. It is admitted that an automobile was rt· 
quired to perform the work that the decedent \Vas e11. 
gaged in. However, it should be noted that decedent 
spent approximately 50 percent of his working time 111 
the company office and was out of the off ice approxi 
mately the other 50 percent of the time (R 47, 162 1 
It is also a fair conclusion to be drawn from the evidence 
that some of the time when he was out of the office, he 
was not engaged in company business and defi-
nitely not engaged in business of which the compam 
approved. His supervisor, Mr. Filmore, testified 0;1' 
cross-examination by plaintiff's attorney, as follows: 
Q. "Leo was never criticized for not spending 
enough time doing company work, was he( 
A. "Yes, he was criticized many times for no! 
spending more time there. He was criticizerl 
for spending time on the golf course.' 
(R 186) 
Thus, it can fairly be said from the evidence in the 
record that not all of the time that the decedent 
away from the company office was he engaged in the 
company's business and on business of which the com· 
pany approved. This would tend to reduce even more 
the percentage of use of the vehicle in the course of his 
employment. 
The Appelant's have cited numerous cases in their 
brief by which they hope to persuade the Court that the 
Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that the 
death of the decedent did not arise out of or in the count 
of his employment. However, the Appellant's have in· 
12 
uieil strained i:1e interpretation of the cases they !m \ c 
dLu and if the cases were fairly quoted in s 
l1rieL, they, i11 fact, would support the position 01' L:.: 
lumm1ssion. There are two Utah cases that are most 
1tcl'llt: G. lJ. ·JI oscr vs. Industrial Commission of 
i111h, ct al, 21Utah2nd 51, 440 Pac. 2nd 23 (1908), 
' ,111d Jiuile.IJ vs. Utah State Industrial Commission, 16 
rt ah :208, 398 Pac. 2nd 545 ( 1965) . Both are dis-
tinguishable from the facts that we presently ha Ye uwlcr 
1ousickration. In the Bailey case the decedent ,, 
11·rril'.c station operator and was self-employed. TLu.,, 
he was both employer and employee under the Y / (,1,: -
111en 's Compensation Act. His death occurred 01:e rn.or11-
111g \1 hile driving an automobile registered in his namt: 
1q lite service station that he operated. The court held 
that in this instance, Bailey as the employee, was per-
forming a substantial service for Bailey as the employ-
er in bringing the car to work and thus, fit into an ex-
1rpiion to the going an coming rule. HoweYer, the 
rnurt based its decision upon the facts of that case 
11hieh revealed that the station wagon was used for 
1nwrgency calls at all hours and carried in it necessary 
lnrils and implements to service or repair customer's 
;111lomobiles. The decedent, in that case, also permitted 
to use the car while their cars were being sen'-
1ced at the decedent's service station. The decedent ia 
1Le Bailey case also carried the station wagon upon the 
liooks as a business asset and the oil and gas which it 
11sc·d 11 as charged as a business expense. 
Thus, in effect, the car in question in the Bailey 
' 1·,e 11 as a company car and the cases are quite clear that 
11l1«u ait employee is driving a company car to work for 
13 
use by the company, the employee is covered uude1 
Workmen's Compensation. In the Bailey case the auto 
mobile was used primarily for the benefit of tbe busi-
ness. Others were allowed to drive it and it was co11-
sidered as business property by Bailey. 
In the instant case before the court, Lundberg wa1 
the exclusive user of his automobile and the car was i11 
no way company property. As is noted previously in 
this brief, the automobile was not driven to the compam 
office for use by the company, but only as a means 111 
transportation by the decedent to the company of fict 1 
because from that point on during the course of the day '. 
other vehicles were available for the decedent's use 
1 
Thus, there was no requirement that the Lundberg 
automobile be brought to the company place of business \ 
for the company's use. ! 
In the most recent Utah case, G. B. Moser vs. /11-
dustrial Commission of Utah, et al, (Supra), it is clearly 
shown that more is needed to come within an exceptio11 
to the going and coming from rule than merely driving 
one's car to work for the convenience of oneself. In the 
Moser case the plaintiff was injured while trying to start 
a truck and drive it to his employer's place of business 
As stated by the decision in that case: 
"Under their arrangement, the plaintiff owned 
the truck but leased it to the company by an 
agreement which gives the latter the full right 
of possession, use and control of it." 
Under these circumstances, the court granted relief 
emphasizing the effect of the lease agreement and say· 
ing as follows: 
14 
"Inasmuch as under the lease the truck was 
committed to be used in defendant's business 
with the full right of possession and control, the 
effect as related to the issue here is the same as 
if the truck belonged to the company, and it 
makes no difference who the owner was. Though 
it was parked in a lot near the plaintiff's home, 
in order to continue its function in the def end-
ant' s business it was necessary that someone 
take it down to the defendant's terminal." 
This obviously is not the situation in the case at bar 
, there being no contractual obligation of the decede21t 
lo bring his automobile to the place of employment for 
the use of the employer in the employer's business. .L1 
the l\1oser case, it appeared that the court felt it \YJ.s 
perhaps reaching the outer limits of recovery and felt 
that further facts other than the lease agreement may 
lie needed to justify granting recovery therein and the 
court said as follows: 
"Coupled with the above are the further sig-
nificant facts that the problem of the truck stall-
ing had been reported to the manager; and that 
he had given directions to the plaintiff who was 
in the process of carrying this out when he was 
injured." 
The Appellant's cite the Davis vs. Bjorenson, :298 
X.W. 829, Iowa, (1940). However, this case can be 
rliffcrentiated from the present facts on the same basis 
tlrnt the Bailey case can be differentiated; to wit, the 
employee was required to bring the automobile to work 
i11 the morning by his employer for the use by the com-
pany. In the Davis case the automobile for all intents 
15 
and purposes was treated as a company car and wui 
used as such. The following quotation makes it ven 
clear that the situation in Davis is very different fro1;1 
the facts presently at bar: 
"Under the employment agreement, the claim.
1 
ant regularly furnished his automobile to the 
employer for the use in the business as a service 
car. At night the car was kept at the 
home where he was subject to emergency service 
calls requiring its use. During regular working 
hours the car was kept at the employer's place 
of business for use in the business, not only by 
the claimant,, but also by the employer and by 
other employees. Thus the car was an instrumen-
tality of the business at all hours of the day and • 
was subject to that use at night. ... It was his 
duty and this duty was regular and definite, to 
take the automobile to the employer's shop for I 
its use in the business, by others as well as claim· · 
ant. In so doing, he was performing for his em· 
ployer a substantial service required by his em· 
ployment at the place and in the manner so re·. 
quired. In the language of the able trial court, I 
'claimant had no selection of his mode of travel 
to work, that he was required under the terms of 
his contract to drive his own car from his home 
to the shop where it was available to his em· 
ployer for use in the employer's business.'" (Em· 
phasis added) 
The Appellants dte King vs. State Industrial Ac· 
cident Commission, 211 Or. 40, 315 Pac. 2nd, 148, Ore· 
gon (1957), as being directly in point. However, in that 
case, the employee was killed while riding in his own boat 
across a bay in order to aid in the construction of a log 
16 
boom. The decedent and other employees would drive, or 
by other means, arrive at the dock on the edge of the 
bay. From there they had to cross a two mile bay to reach 
the site of construction. The employer furnished a boat 
for the use of the employees but on this particular occa-
1ion, the decedent used his own boat and took along with 
him three other men who were employees of the employ-
er. The Appellants, in their brief, at page 12 state as 
follows: 
"His employer, who had no contractual obli-
gation to provide transportation to the place of 
employment, had, nevertheless, made available 
a company owned boat for use of the employees 
in transporting themselves to the place of em-
ployment and then for their use in the duties of 
constructing the log boom." 
The opinion in this case i)tates at page 154, Supra, 
as follows which is clearly contrary to the statement 
that the Appellants have inserted their brief: 
"We believe that the record warrants a belief, 
as we have stated before, that the employers 
were under an implied obligation to furnish a 
means whereby the men could cross the bay. In 
short, they rendered the tugboat available to the 
men as an incident of the contract of employ-
ment. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, it can clearly be seen that the employer had 
provided transportation from the edge of the bay whicl1 
would be the point at which the employees arrived at 
their place of employment to the log boom that they 
were working on. In this particular case, the decedent, 
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in effect, had arrived at work and was using his 011 11 
boat directly in the employer's In the case ar: 
bar the accident occurred, and the Commission so fouuJ. 
prior to the time that the Appellant had arrived at hi, 
place of employment. Appellants also cite Jones :··., 
Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, Texas Civil Ap· 
peal, 223 South West 2nd, 286, ( 1961). Which case 
can be readily distinguished. In that case Jones wa1 
required to use his own car on the job and drive it from 
place to place servicing household equipment. He 1'::11 
reimbursed for these trips, including his trips to work. . 
He also transported all of the company tools which ht 
used in performance service for the employer in the car 
and was doing so at the time of the accident. In that : 
case the court stated as follows: 
"In the case we have here, the employee, Jones 1 
was at the time of his injury, engaged in the per· 
formance of the duty of his employment. He was 
doing what his contract of employment either 
expressly authorized him to do or required him 
to do. He was driving the automobile from a 1 
place he had taken same in the authorized prose· 1 
cution of his employer's business to be further 
used in the prosecut.ion of that business at an· 
other place ... " (Emphasis added) 
The last major case cited in the Appellant's brief 
is Smith vs. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. 
447 Pac. 2nd, 365, 73 Cal. Reports 253, ( 1968). The 
Appellants representation of this case is erroneous and 
in fact, is directly contrary to what the case holds. 111 
this case the decedent worked for the county as a 
worker and was killed on his way to work one morning 
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The major issue upon which the decisions of both ,:_...: 
Commission and the Court were based was whether lie 
1:ould use the county car on the job. The Appelian:u 
state at page 14 of their brief: 
"The county had cars available for the use of 
the social workers, however,J'he deceased had 
never availed himself of their use, although he 
had discretion in that regard." 
This is clearly contrary to the findings. The 
Commission found that substantial evidence indicateli 
that county cars were available for Smith's use durmg 
the day and based their denial of recovery on this ev1-
<lence. The Commission in the Smith case as the Com-
did in the present case before the bar reasoned 
that since these automobiles were available for the em-
ployee's use, he was not required to drive his own car 
and thus he was subject to the going and coming rule. 
The court, in the Smith case in granting the recovery 
based its holdings strictly on it.s own determination 
Smith was required to furnish his own car and could 
use the county car. That this is true under the facts of 
that particular case is supported by the following quo-
tations: 
On page 369 of the opinion the court states: 
"Hence the employer's requirement that the 
worker furnish a vehicle of transportation on the 
job curtails the application of the going and 
coming exclusion." 
On page 370: 
"Surely in this day of a highly motorized so-
ciety we cannot cast the going and coming rule as 
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a protective covering over the shoulders of tn1 Jea 
employer who, for his own advantage, demana10ut 
that the employer furnish the car on the job . 1 (Emphasis added) rto 
It is thus quite clear that the court in the Smitl 
ca_se determined that it was demanded by the employu 
or required by the employer that a vehicle be furnisheu 
by the employee. The Commission, in the instant cast! 
found quite to the contrary; to wit, that no requiremen:: 
that an automobile be furnished could be found fro1u 
the evidence. Under the general rule regarding tht 
Findings of Fact being exclusively the province of tht 
Commission and under the substantial evidence support-
ing that finding the decision of the Commission musl 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial evidence to support the Fin<l· 
ings of Fact of the Commission, some disputed and some 
not disputed, but in either event, the findings drawn 
from said evidence are reasonable. 'Vith the Findingi 
of Fact being reasonable and based upon substantinl 
evidence, the Conclusion of Law drawn therefrom is thr 
only conclusion that could be reached; to wit, that th'' 
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tbdeath of the decedent, Leo L. Lundberg, did not arise 
na, 011t of or in the course of his employment and the deci-
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